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Body schema in robotics: a review
Abstract
How is our body imprinted in our brain? This seemingly simple question is a subject of investigations of
diverse disciplines, psychology, and philosophy originally complemented by neurosciences more
recently. Despite substantial efforts, the mysteries of body representations are far from uncovered. The
most widely used notions-body image and body schema-are still waiting to be clearly defined. The
mechanisms that underlie body representations are coresponsible for the admiring capabilities that
humans or many mammals can display: combining information from multiple sensory modalities,
controlling their complex bodies, adapting to growth, failures, or using tools. These features are also
desirable in robots. This paper surveys the body representations in biology from a functional or
computational perspective to set ground for a review of the concept of body schema in robotics. First,
we examine application-oriented research: how a robot can improve its capabilities by being able to
automatically synthesize, extend, or adapt a model of its body. Second, we summarize the research area
in which robots are used as tools to verify hypotheses on the mechanisms underlying biological body
representations. We identify trends in these research areas and propose future research directions.
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Abstract—How is our body imprinted in our brain? This
seemingly simple question is a subject of investigations of diverse
disciplines, psychology, and philosophy originally complemented
by neurosciences more recently. Despite substantial efforts, the
mysteries of body representations are far from uncovered. The
most widely used notions—body image and body schema—are
still waiting to be clearly defined. The mechanisms that underlie
body representations are coresponsible for the admiring capa-
bilities that humans or many mammals can display: combining
information from multiple sensory modalities, controlling their
complex bodies, adapting to growth, failures, or using tools. These
features are also desirable in robots. This paper surveys the body
representations in biology from a functional or computational per-
spective to set ground for a review of the concept of body schema
in robotics. First, we examine application-oriented research: how
a robot can improve its capabilities by being able to automatically
synthesize, extend, or adapt a model of its body. Second, we
summarize the research area in which robots are used as tools to
verify hypotheses on the mechanisms underlying biological body
representations. We identify trends in these research areas and
propose future research directions.
Index Terms—Body image, body representation, body schema,
forward model, robotics, self-calibration.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE basic notion of body schema encloses a group ofbody representations which are essential for body motion
and a meaningful interaction with the environment carried
out by an embodied agent. The body schema allows for inte-
gration of information from proprioception, vision, audition,
the vestibular system, tactile sensing, and from the motor
system in order to keep an up-to-date representation of the
positions of the different body parts in space. Typically, these
representations are involved in movement preparation and the
representation of space in different frames of reference to be
used by different behaviors. Such representations are the central
subject of many studies in the cognitive sciences, especially
in the neurosciences. The concepts of a postural schema and a
surface schema were first introduced by Head and Holmes [1].
In their view, the postural schema represents the awareness we
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have of our bodies’ position in space, and the surface schema
represents our capacity to locate stimuli on the surface of the
skin. Since then, many other classifications and taxonomies ap-
peared trying to structure the plethora of body representations;
yet up to now, the literature has not converged to any of them.
Biological agents are able to adapt seamlessly to new situa-
tions or cope with failures. To a large extent, this is because the
body representations required to support their behaviors can
dynamically adapt to new circumstances. These properties are
also desirable in robots; today, their operation is still restricted
to static or limited environments, and resilience to failure is typ-
ically absent. When trying to bridge this gap, many roboticists
look to biology for inspiration to integrate some of the features
of a biological body schema into their machines. While this
flow of information—from biology to robotics—was dominant
so far, there also exists a route in the opposite direction. Many
of the mechanisms underlying the body schema are still a mys-
tery to cognitive scientists. Here, robots can qualify as useful
tools to test hypotheses that have been put forward up to this
day. In particular, although there is rapid progress, to a large
extent thanks to the neurosciences with their imaging tech-
niques, the investigation of some mechanisms requires whole
brain–body–environment systems as test-beds. Experiments
on robots can thus complement the research in computational
neuroscience.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we offer a re-
view of body representations in the context of biology. After
discussing taxonomies of body representations and how these
are supported by studies on disorders, we will focus on topics
that we consider of greatest relevance for robotics: plasticity
of body representations (development, adaptation, extension),
coordinate transformations, and the relationship between body
schema and forward models. Second, we provide an overview
of the engineering-oriented work in which a body schema
serves to control a robot and to improve its behavior when
faced with unexpected circumstances. In theory, an enormous
part of research in robotics and control could fall into this sec-
tion, since models (plant models) used to control robots are
ubiquitous. However, we will show how this representation is
different from the ones that take inspiration from biology and
further concentrate on the latter. There are many axes according
to which the research in robotics could be structured. For us,
the principle axis will be the nature of representation: explicit
versus implicit. Third, a section on robots employed as tools to
model biological body representations is presented. We think
that this body of work—investigating whole brain-body-envi-
ronment systems—is a necessary complement of computational
neuroscience. We conclude by identifying the major trends and
suggesting future research directions.
1943-0604/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
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II. BODY REPRESENTATIONS IN BIOLOGY
Significant evidence has been accumulated up to this day tes-
tifying that there are representations of the body in the brain. It is
also very likely that there is no single unitary representation, but
rather several, partial representations that serve different pur-
poses. We will discuss the basic taxonomies of body representa-
tions and define the two most widely used notions: body schema
and body image. Disorders and dissociation studies are useful
to get insight into the structure of the putative body representa-
tions. We will discuss two in detail and present an overview of
those that we consider relevant for robotics.
Body representations are plastic over time. This property is
largely responsible for many of the capabilities that animals dis-
play. We will discuss the developmental time scale first. How
does an infant acquire its body representation? How does it de-
velop a sense of body ownership and agency? Then, we will
review the plasticity of body representations over short time
scales, minutes for instance. We will examine the “rubber hand
illusion” and extension of body representations in tool use. The
next topic of undisputed direct relevance for robotics are coordi-
nate transformations. Finally, we have included a section which
demonstrates the notions discussed on a concrete scenario. We
also establish an explicit relation to forward internal models—a
closely related concept. The idea is to provide enough informa-
tion for a roboticist to get an initial functional understanding
of the topic and to equip her with initial pointers to the litera-
ture. We have to admit that this section is strongly biased toward
body representations in humans and primates. Other animals re-
mained out of the scope of this review. However, studying body
representations in simpler animals than humans can provide no
less valuable insights for roboticists.
A. What Is a Body Schema?
Two main taxonomies form a first attempt to differentiate the
variety of body representations: the dyadic and the triadic tax-
onomies [2]. Both draw a line between representations that are
used for action and those used for perception. This functional
division is grounded on the hypothesis that visual as well as so-
matosensory processing is carried out in two distinct nervous
pathways: one for action and another for conscious perception
and object recognition [3]–[5]. In visual processing, these are
the “what” and “how” streams as suggested in [6] (earlier dis-
tinction between “what” and “where” pathways was suggested
in [7]).
The visual pathway for action, the “how” or dorsal stream,
goes from the occipital lobe to the motor cortex through the
parietal cortex. The pathway for perception, the “what” or ven-
tral stream, goes from the occipital lobe to the temporal lobe.
A similar separation can be observed in somatosensory percep-
tion. The pathway for action involves the anterior parietal cortex
(APC), eventually the secondary somatosensory area (SII) and
terminates in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) [4]; the pathway
for perception involves a similar route but terminates at the in-
sula rather than at the PPC. The right PPC might also be involved
when integration of spatio–temporal information is required for
the recognition of objects as well as body configuration (see also
[8] and [4], and [6] for a comparison between the two pathways
for action and perception in the somatosensory processing and
visual and auditory processing).
On these grounds, the dyadic taxonomy distinguishes
between body schema and body image. The former are senso-
rimotor representations of the body used to guide movement
and action, the latter are used to form our perceptual (body
percept), conceptual (body concept) or emotional (body af-
fect) judgments towards our body [3]. However, especially
the concept of body image is problematic, lacking a positive
definition; it seems that once we are done with a body schema,
everything else can fall into body image [2]. Therefore, the
triadic taxonomy further splits the representations belonging
to the general concept of body image [9]. One of these repre-
sentations, the body structural description, entails a topological
representation (mainly visual) of the position of the different
body parts in relation to each other (e.g., the forearm extends
the upper arm via a hinge joint). The other representation,
body semantics, comprises a semantic representation of the
body which includes the names of the different body parts,
their functions as well as potential relations to external artifacts
(e.g., shoes are used on the feet, and feet can be used to kick a
football).
The functional axis, action versus perception, is only one pos-
sible criterion to distinguish between various body representa-
tions, and an oversimplifying one for that matter. Other fea-
tures used to classify body representations are availability to
consciousness (unconscious versus conscious), and dynamics
(short-term versus long-term). However, the weight of the cri-
teria varies relative to the author and sometimes even the same
notion is ascribed opposite properties (see [2] for more details).
While these additional axes are useful, they still do not provide
any clear taxonomy of body representations. Perhaps, such an
endeavor cannot be successful, because we are not faced with
two or three distinct representations, but rather with a panoply
of many interacting partial representations.
Nevertheless, there is definitely some agreement that there is
something like a body schema—a sensorimotor representation
of the body used for action. Typically, it would not be avail-
able to consciousness1 and would encompass both short-term
(e.g., position of a limb at a given instant) and long-term dy-
namics (e.g., biomechanical properties and size of limbs). Since
we are mainly interested in body representations in robots, this
notion will be our primary focus. Our decision is motivated by
the following reasons: 1) as stated above, there is certain con-
sensus on the existence of a body schema; 2) the fact that it is
a representation for action finds a natural counterpart in robots
which can then be employed to perform tasks; and 3) we think
that robots have not yet reached the level of competence where
notions like conscious representations can be investigated in a
grounded fashion.
The notion of body image—as a perception-based represen-
tation—will not be excluded from our investigation; however,
we will restrict it to the body structural or topological represen-
tation, leaving apart the domains of body concept or body affect.
1Though it may become conscious under certain circumstances, such as
during motor imagery [9].
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B. Disorders
What are the grounds on which the body representations are
classified into the taxonomies we have come across? Underpin-
ning these taxonomies are a variety of studies which analyze the
functional impact of some impairment on the behavior of a sub-
ject (see [4]). It is the fact that some subjects are able to perform
normally on some body-related tasks but not on others that al-
lows to distinguish between the different representations.
Probably the most mentioned disorder in the context of re-
search on body schema is that of deafferentation. Deafferentation
in general is the (total or partial) deterioration of afferent signals,
i.e., signals that go from the periphery to the central nervous
system. When applied to body-related representations, deaf-
ferentation is the (complete or partial) loss of proprioceptive and
tactile signals whether their origin is in the periphery or in more
central areas. Paillard [5] reported two cases of deafferented
patients with very different behaviors. In one case, the patient
G.L. was able to perceive a signal applied to her body, report
verbally the location of the stimulus as well as to point to the
correct location of the limb part stimulated on a body sketch.
However, when asked to point with her right hand to the part of
her own body which had been stimulated, she was unable to do
so. In the other (somehow more bizarre) case, patient R.S. was
unable to consciously perceive tactile stimuli, joint positioning,
temperature or pain in her own body; she could for example cut
or burn herself without noticing. R.S. failed to locate verbally
a given tactile stimuli on her own body but curiously (even to
herself) she could point flawlessly to the body part stimulated.
According to Paillard, these two cases provide a case for an intact
body schema with an impaired body image (R.S.) and a case for
an impaired body schema with an intact body image (G.L.); i.e.,
they provide a case for the distinction between the two body rep-
resentations in the brain as mentioned in the previous section [3].
Cases showing a further distinction between body structural
description and body semantics can also be found in the liter-
ature. In a large group study, Schwoebel and Coslett [9] ana-
lyzed subjects on three types of measures: one assessing the in-
tegrity of the body schema, one assessing the integrity of the
body structural description, and another assessing the integrity
of the body semantic representation. Each performance mea-
sure involved a set of different tasks [9]. In the first measure,
aimed at assessing the integrity of the body schema, subjects
were required either to: 1) imagine or execute different finger
movements; or 2) to indicate the laterality of a hand in a picture
(i.e., left or right hand). The second measure, aimed at assessing
the body structural description, included three tasks: 1) to point
to the location in one’s own body of a body part depicted in an
image; 2) to point to the location of a stimulus applied to a given
body part; and 3) to point to one of three pictured body parts that
were closer to a given target body surface. The third measure,
aimed to assess the integrity of the body semantic description,
involved two tasks: 1) to match one of three pictured body parts
with another functionally related target part (e.g., the elbow has
as similar function as the knee; they are both hinge joints); and
2) to match a pictured item of cloth with one of four given pic-
tured body parts. They found out that 13 of the patients analyzed
failed on tasks involving the measure of body schema integrity
but performed normally on the other two measures. Three of the
TABLE I
DISORDERS RELATED TO THE BODY SCHEMA (EXTRACTED FROM [2])
patients failed to carry out successfully the tasks involved in the
body structural description measure, but were able to carry out
normally the tasks involved in the other two measures. Finally,
two of the patients failed to execute the tasks related to the body
semantic measures but performed normally in the other tasks.
These results provide grounds to support the triadic taxonomy.
If robots are to be used as models of biological (in this case
human) body representations, they can eventually be also sub-
ject to such tests—failures in robots can be compared to disor-
ders in humans. A list with main disorders related to body rep-
resentations is given in Table I. This list is a short version of the
one offered in Vignemont [2]. The original table was pruned in
order to give only the information most relevant for roboticists;
the disorders removed were basically related to eating disorders
or emotional responses related to body representations.
C. Plasticity of Body Representations
1) Development, Body Ownership, and Agency: How do
the various body representations originate? They arise during
the process of development immediately after birth (or even
before—in the womb). We have to rely more on psychological
rather than neurophysiological data here, since brain imaging
techniques are not readily applicable on infants. As reported
by Rochat [10], infants spend substantial time in their early
months observing and touching themselves. Rochat calls it the
visual–proprioceptive calibration of the body. Through this
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process of babbling, intermodal redundancies, temporal contin-
gencies, and spatial congruences are picked up. Environmental
stimulation (single touch) can be distinguished from self-stim-
ulation (double-touch + proprioceptive stimulation) [11]. If we
treat this process as relying mainly on perception, we can view
it as the acquisition of the body image. However, the infants
not only observe, but actively involve their motor apparatus in
the explorations (e.g., [12]). Hence, the development of body
schema probably takes place at the same time.
Hand in hand with the development of the body representa-
tions, the infants acquire a notion of body ownership and agency.
By sense of body ownership we mean that the infant knows that
it is its body that is moving, even passively; sense of agency cor-
responds to the notion that the infant (or agent) knows that it is
causing or generating an action. We mean agency in a low-level
sense here—prereflective, sensorimotor, and functional, rather
than in a phenomenological sense (see e.g., [13] for a disam-
biguation). Basically, a sense of body ownership would be dis-
rupted by a sensory experience that does not match the pre-
viously learned regularities between modalities (i.e., mismatch
with body image); sense of agency would be disrupted by a sen-
sory–motor mismatch (i.e., a mismatch with a body schema).2
However, as it is hard to separate body image from body schema,
it is also hard to separate sense of body ownership from sense
of agency (see [14] for details and experimental treatment of
this issue). The above-mentioned low-level capabilities consti-
tute the basis for action recognition in self, action recognition
in others, and self-other discrimination. This is further related
to action mirroring (where the mirror neurons are active) and
imitation (see Rizzolatti et al. [15]). Such capabilities consti-
tute a natural extension of our topic, but will remain largely out
of the scope of this review.
2) Rubber Hand Illusion: The body representations are not
only plastic during development. They can also respond to large
changes in the body, such as limb loss (see e.g., Ramachandran
and Blakeslee [16]). Moreover, body representations can also
adapt over much shorter time scales. Let us first look how this
can happen on the perceptual side—modifying the body image.
Holmes and Spence [17] made an extensive review on different
behavioral, neurophysiological, and neuropsychological studies
regarding evidence on the possibility to “incorporate” objects
not connected directly to the body by multisensory integration.
A prominent series of studies, started by Botvinick and Cohen
[18], involves the “rubber hand illusion.” A subject looks at
a rubber replica of her hand while her own hand is hidden.
Through simultaneous tactile stimulation of the subject’s hand
and the rubber hand, visible on the rubber hand only, the rubber
hand becomes incorporated into the body image and the subject
is deceived to think she “owns” the rubber hand. In other words,
simultaneous tactile stimulation, together with congruent visual
and proprioceptive feedback, causes a rapid adaptation of the
body image and the rubber hand enters our sense of body own-
ership. Graziano [19] reported a similar phenomenon in mon-
2In more concrete terms, this means there will be a mismatch between the sen-
sory feedback predicted by a forward model from a motor command (efference)
copy and the actual sensory input (reafference). This is also referred to as the
“comparator model.” However, for both body ownership and agency, the situa-
tion is more complicated and involves a top–down component as well—knowl-
edge about the context [13], [14].
Fig. 1. Changes in bimodal receptive field properties following tool-use. The
somatosensory receptive fields (sRF) of cells in this region were identified by
light touches, passive manipulation of joints, or active hand-use. The visual RF
(vRF) was defined as the area in which cellular responses were evoked by vi-
sual probes (the most effective ones being those moving towards the sRF). (a)
sRF (blue area) of the “distal type” bimodal neurons and their vRF (pink areas)
(b) before tool-use, (c) immediately after tool-use, and (d) when just passively
grabbing the rake. (e) sRF (blue area) of “proximal type” bimodal neurons, and
their vRF (pink areas), (f) before, and (g) immediately after tool-use. Reprinted
from [31] with permission.
keys as well. More recently, other studies ([20]–[23]) further
explored the rubber hand paradigm, also in the case of hand am-
putees [24]. The appropriation of the external object as part of
the body representation of the person goes to the extent that if
the rubber hand is threatened, the person shows a similar level
of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and intero-
ceptive awareness [25]. This effect can be found in the appro-
priation of virtual bodies as well [26].
3) Tool Use: Tsakiris et al. [14] pointed out that the basic
rubber hand illusion setup lacks ecological validity, because it
does not involve bodily movement. In other words, it is not a
usual situation for primates or humans not to actively perform
actions, but rely on multisensory integration only. Efferent in-
formation may play a key role, bringing us back to the difficulty
of separation between body schema and image, or body own-
ership and agency. This leads us to another prominent experi-
mental paradigm: body schema extension during tool use (body
schema because now we are concerned with representations for
action). Primates can manipulate objects in different ways and
some can use tools to achieve a particular goal. Maravita and
Iriki [27] investigated the integration of a tool into one’s body
schema in a macaque monkey that was retrieving food with
the help of a rake. Neuronal activity of bimodal neurons (i.e.,
neurons that react to both somatosensory and visual stimula-
tion) was recorded from the intraparietal cortex. Two groups
of neurons were identified: “distal type” and “proximal type”
(see Fig. 1). The former responded to somatosensory stimuli
at the hand and visual stimuli near the hand. The visual recep-
tive field (region of space in which the presence of a stimulus
will alter the firing of a particular neuron) of these neurons fol-
lowed the hand in space. After the monkey had used the tool
for about five minutes, the visual receptive field of some neu-
rons expanded to cover the entire length of the tool [Fig. 1(c)].
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The visual receptive field of the latter neuron group—the “prox-
imal type”—was not centered around the hand, but spanned
the whole space within reach [Fig. 1(g)]. This space is called
peripersonal space. As the body and the space immediately sur-
rounding it are always in close interaction, the same seems to
hold for their representations. Therefore, the representation of
the body and of peripersonal space—space within reach—have
to go hand in hand [28]. In the monkey, this space was expanded
accordingly after working with the tool to accommodate the
whole space that can be accessed with the tool.
Several studies [29]–[34] followed that show the ability of
the primate brain to incorporate tools into its body representa-
tions and use them for coordinated action. The visual receptive
field was extended by the tool when it was used for retrieving
food, but not when the monkey just held the rake passively in its
hand [Fig. 1(d)]. This confirms the hypothesis that action con-
text plays a key role. It is also probable—unlike in the rubber
hand illusion scenario—that the subject is not fully “deceived”
to think that the tool is part of her body—the tool does not look
like the hand—but only incorporates it into the representation
in order to be able to use it as a “body auxiliary” [14].
4) Intelligent Tools: A tool can be much more than a pas-
sive rake. It can be an artifact with “intelligence” of its own.
Slater et al. [35] show how it is possible to induce the incorpo-
ration of virtual bodies in the body representation. The advances
in brain–computer interfaces [36]–[38] have made it possible to
use biological signals to control robotic devices, enabling their
users to perform activities otherwise out of their reach. These in-
terfaces allow direct interaction with cortical processes that the
user can control. So far evidence with monkeys [39], [40] show
that they can “incorporate” intelligent devices into their body
representation. Other studies with amputees [41]–[43] present
evidence of changes in the cortical activation due to the interac-
tion with an intelligent prosthetic hand.
Taking the “intelligence” of the artifact or device one step fur-
ther, Sanchez et al. [44] and DiGiovanna [45] explore symbiotic
systems where not only is the artifact incorporated in the body
representation of its user, this time a rat, but at the same time, the
intelligent artifact actively participates in the process. The arti-
ficial system taps into the user’s brain and uses reinforcement
learning to modify its own parameters in order to maximize the
match between the user’s intention and the action performed
with the artifact. Thus, both the user and the tool coadapt to ac-
complish the task.
It is not hard to imagine how the plasticity of body repre-
sentations, which was discussed in this section, can be useful
for robots. A robot that can automatically acquire a model of
itself that can then be used for control will save a lot of work
to programmers. If it is able to automatically adapt the model
to new circumstances—body extensions, wear and tear, or even
substantial failures—it will lead to a new generation of robots
which can leave their restricted work conditions.
D. Coordinate Transformations
A key issue that is often mentioned in the context of the body
schema is the one of coordinate transformations. The problem
is simple to formulate, but hard to tackle. Imagine you see an
orange at some location in space and you want to grasp it. It
might seem trivial for you to simply stretch your arm and reach
it, but how is the brain successful at it? The orange falls on some
location in the retina, which is dependent on the position of the
eyes, the head, and the torso; if you move either of them (or all,
as far as their movements do not cancel out) then the location
of the orange in the retina will change accordingly. To perform
a particular movement the brain has to have (in principle) at
least one stable frame of reference (FoR), i.e., a FoR which is
invariant to changes in the position of some of the body parts
(say, the eyes or the head). A stable FoR for reaching is the torso
frame of reference, since all the movements of the hand have
to be necessarily executed in relation to the torso—due to the
physical structure which connects the two body parts. However,
to have the position of the orange encoded in relation to the
torso, the brain has to convert first the retina coordinates into
eye coordinates using the location of the orange on the retina,
then transform the position in eye FoR to the head FoR using
the current orientation of the eyes with respect to the head, and
finally transform the location of the object with respect to the
head into torso FoR using the orientation of the head in relation
to the torso.
The brain areas which are often mentioned in the context
of body schema and coordinate transformations are: the lat-
eral intraparietal area (LIP), which encodes information relevant
for saccadic eye movements [46], the ventral intraparietal area
(VIP) which encodes both visual and somatosensory informa-
tion [47], [48] and is connected to LIP area [49] and premotor
areas responsible for head movements [50], the parietal reach
region (PRR) which encodes reaching information [51], and the
anterior parietal area which encodes grasping information. Each
of these areas seems to use different frames of reference. This
would be expected as different behaviors might benefit from a
different encoding. For example, parts of LIP and VIP are sup-
posed to represent the position of a visual target in both eye-cen-
tered and head-centered coordinate systems [47], [52]; neurons
in the PRR should have the eye as their reference frame [51].
Interestingly, other neurons in the PRR have also been found
which seem to encode the difference between a target in eye
FoR and the current position of the hand also in eye FoR [53].
Such neurons seem to be particularly suited to output an error
signal with the distance between the hand and the target [53].
Similar neurons have also been found in area 5 of the posterior
parietal cortex, which is adjacent to the PRR (see [54]).
But how does the brain compute these coordinate transfor-
mations? In the classical view (coming from geometry and ap-
plied in robotics, for instance), coordinate transformations are
computed explicitly and applied sequentially; for example to
pass from eye FoR to hand FoR, the brain would compute all
the required transformations in series: between the eyes and
the head, then between the head and the torso, and finally be-
tween the torso and the hand. We will see examples of this ap-
proach throughout the robotic part of the paper, in particular in
Section III-C. However, in a novel view, coordinate transforma-
tions can be computed implicitly and in parallel [55]. The above
mentioned neurons which encode for the difference between the
hand and the target are a good example of such a view. In this
particular case the only modality used for the coordinate trans-
formation is vision; the positions of the hand and the target are
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Fig. 2. Population-based encoding combined with gain fields to achieve coor-
dinate transformations between a retina-centered FoR and a head-centered FoR
(see text for details).
both acquired from the visual input. In fact, relatively little is
known about the influence of proprioception for computing co-
ordinate transformations.
One of the most relevant findings in brain research on coordi-
nate transformations is that of gain modulation (also called gain
fields, or fields of gain). Gain modulation consists of “a change
in the response amplitude of a neuron that is not accompanied
by a modification of response selectivity” [56]. It is a nonlinear
way of combining information from two or more sources, let
them be sensor, motor, or cognitive. Typically gain fields are
used within a population-based encoding, in which several neu-
rons respond to a region of space. The use of a population based
encoding combined with gain fields for coordinate transforma-
tions is depicted in Fig. 2. The plots show the reconstruction
of the signal obtained from different population of five neurons
(circles below the plots). In situation A, the eyes are looking
to the left (fixation point is marked by red filled circle) and a
stimulus (a star) is further to the left. In the neural populations,
it has the following effect: in the neurons that encode stimulus
in the retinal frame of reference (top), we see more activation
on the left; the neurons coding for eye position (bottom) also
display higher activation on the left side; the population that
has a head-centered reference frame encoding of the stimulus
(middle) displays a combination (in fact a multiplication [57])
of the retina-centered stimulus and the eye position, as repre-
sented by a high amplitude in the left of the spectrum. The sit-
uations in B and C arise by applying the same rule. In C, for
instance, the stimulus in the retina encoding is still on the left,
but the eye is looking to the right. The head-centered encoding
is a combination of these—in this case "contradictory" stimuli,
with a mean in between and a lower amplitude. For instance, the
parts of LIP and VIP discussed above (with position of a visual
target in both eye-centered and head-centered coordinates) have
gain fields that depend on gaze direction, leading to body-cen-
tered coordinates useful for gaze control and object reaching
[47], [58].
E. Body Schema and Forward Models
While the taxonomies (Section II-A) help us to roughly define
the landscape of body representations, they still stop short off a
concrete enough characterization that would allow one to build
a computational or robotic model. The goal of this section is to
illustrate some of the concepts put forth in the previous section
on a simplified, but concrete enough, scenario and to clarify the
relationship of body schema to the closely related concepts of
peripersonal space and forward models.
Fig. 3 presents a didactic biologically motivated scenario,
where an agent is interacting with an object on a table. The
top part of the figure shows the agent and its visual field on the
right, and a corresponding hypothetical neural architecture on
the left. We have included three modalities: visual, propriocep-
tive, and tactile. In the visual modality, there are two hypothet-
ical neural ensembles: one corresponding to the image on the
camera (retina), and another which represents the same image
in a body-centered reference frame. The position of the object
as well as the hand is displayed in the activation. The transfor-
mation to the body-centered view is achieved by combining the
camera image with the position of the head. Whereas regarding
the position of the object, there is only visual information avail-
able, the location of the hand can also be obtained from propri-
oception in arm and hand.
Where is the body schema in this schematics? We offer the
following interpretation: the activations in the individual neural
fields are the short-term body schema—they represent the posi-
tion or configuration of the body at one particular instant. The
links between the neuronal ensembles, on the other hand, belong
to a long-term body schema.3 They are relationships between
modalities that hold, at least over the here-and-now time-scale,
and that can be used to perform coordinate transformations and
to combine redundant information, such as regarding position
of one’s hand, in an optimal fashion.
Until now, only sensory modalities were involved. However,
to move from one configuration to another, a motor action is
required. A particular activation of arm and hand muscles can
bring the agent to the situation at the bottom right part of Fig. 3,
where it has moved the object in front of its single eye. Can
the agent also learn about the mapping from the initial to the
current state? The motor modality has to enter our representa-
tion, bringing us to the concepts of forward and inverse models
(e.g., [59] and [60]). These concepts come originally from con-
trol theory but were adopted by the field of human motor con-
trol. Given the current sensory state and the motor command
(or its copy—efference copy), a forward model can predict the
next sensory state (or predicted sensory feedback—corollary
discharge, bottom-left in Fig. 3). The so-called inverse model is
a mapping in the opposite direction. Given a target (goal) state,
and the current state, this model provides the motor command
3For reasons of simplicity, there are direct cross-modal mappings in our
scenario. However, multimodal neural ensembles, i.e., those that fuse multiple
modalities, were also reported in the brain. Similar connectivity could never-
theless apply to them as well.
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Fig. 3. Long-term and short-term body schema, and forward models. This figure presents a simple biologically inspired scenario to illustrate the concepts. An agent
is depicted on the right at two different time steps, while trying to grasp an object. The small window in the top-right of each picture shows the view from the agent’s
single eye (or camera). The left part depicts hypothetical neuronal ensembles of different modalities, their connections, and activations. Let us look at the initial
situation (top). The agent is looking to the right and sees a red object in the center of its visual field (red activation in the retina-centered neurons) and its hand slightly
right from it (black activation). However, with respect to the agent’s body, the object is to the right and down. The retina-centered visual neurons can be combined
with proprioception from the head muscles (black activation in the head position neurons) to perform a frame of reference (or coordinate) transformation, resulting
in the activations in the body-centered visual neurons. Regarding the position of the hand, there is additional information from proprioception in the hand. The
coordinate transformation between the visual modality (where the hand is seen) and the proprioceptive can also be performed and the two sources of information
can be combined (double arrow between them). The bottom right part of the figure depicts a situation where the agent has grasped the object and moved it in front
of its eye. The corresponding activations in the modalities are updated (object on the retina is much bigger, head and arm have moved) and there is a new activation
in the tactile modality—on the agent’s palm. The bottom left part illustrates the concept of a forward model: based on the multimodal map at      and a copy of
a motor command, a prediction of the sensory map at      arises.
needed to reach the goal state. Peripersonal space can finally be
also identified in our schematics. It is the space within reach;
therefore, one possible instantiation would be part of the visual
space, for which we can find a motor command (using the in-
verse model) to reach that space.
Forward models bring several advantages. For instance, the
predicted sensory signals can be delivered before the real ones
and can be exploited for control, or they can be compared with
the real reafference and integrated to give a more reliable state
estimation, or used to separate the expected effect of the agent’s
actions from unexpected intervention from the environment. As
Grush [61] points out, the forward or inverse model (Grush uses
the term emulator) can be either a look-up table storing previous
input-output sequences, or it can be an articulated model—a
model that includes some variables corresponding to their coun-
terparts in the musculoskeletal system (e.g., elbow angle, arm
angular inertia, and tension on quadriceps). Some of these vari-
ables can be measured (e.g., by stretch receptors) and these sen-
sors can also be simulated in the emulator. Marques and Holland
[62] propose to call the model that produces imagined sensory
states more or less directly unmediated, and a model that pro-
duces them using a more or less complex self-simulation inter-
acting with a simulated world mediated.
It should be clear by now that a body schema involves
relationships between sensory modalities (such as coordinate
transformations or integration of redundant information from
modalities) and relationships between sensory and motor
modalities. In our didactic scenario, these two components
were separated—cross-modal mappings were between sensory
modalities, whereas a separate forward model was dealing with
a mapping between two sensory states, given a motor action.
Such a division is very tempting and convenient for a robotic
implementation. However, the biological reality may be more
complex and it may not be possible to dissect the sensorimotor
loop like this (see e.g., O’Regan and Noe [63] for a detailed
account). Finally, the body schema has to involve not only
spatial, but also biomechanical information, and it has to be
plastic over time.
III. IMPROVING ROBOT BEHAVIOR THROUGH A BODY SCHEMA
Like natural agents, artificial agents can also acquire senso-
rimotor representations of their own bodies and use them to
guide actions. However, before we discuss the character that
such a model can have, we will discuss whether models or rep-
resentations are in fact needed altogether. After, we will clas-
sify the various forms that a body schema of a robot can take.
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We have used the nature of representation (explicit versus im-
plicit) as a primary axis to divide the spectrum of body repre-
sentations. Regardless of the representation, the key issue will
be automatic acquisition and adaptation of a body schema. In
particular, the application scenarios will include: recognition of
own body, acquisition of its model, and its extension or adapta-
tion when using a tool or after failure.
A. Does a Robot Need a Model?
The necessity for models of the world as well as of the robot
itself comes as natural both to followers of traditional artificial
intelligence or “good old-fashioned artificial intelligence”
(GOFAI) [64], as well as to control engineers. The former work
with symbolic models of the robot and the world, the latter
use typically analytical models of the controlled system—plant
models. This stance—that models, or representations, are
necessary to produce useful behaviors—was challenged by the
so-called new AI, behavior-based AI, or embodied cognitive
science [65], [66]. New AI demonstrated the potential of robots
that do not rely on representations, but rather on embodiment,
and that exploit the interaction with the environment [67].
Relating back to our topic and paraphrasing Brooks, to what
extent can it hold that “the body is its own best model?”
1) Intelligence Without Representation: It has been shown
by the proponents of behavior-based AI that many remarkable
behaviors can be achieved without a model. Examples are the
achievements of Grey Walter [68], and Valentino Braitenberg
[69] with purely reactive agents—agents that have no internal
states, but only direct connections between sensors and motors.
Another case in point that illustrates that a lot can be achieved
without representation is the subsumption architecture of
Rodney Brooks [70], [71]. Inspired by biological evolution,
Brooks created a decentralized control architecture consisting
of different layers. Every layer is a more or less simple coupling
of sensors to motors (responsible for obstacle avoidance, for
instance). Though in this architecture the individual modules
may have internal states (as they are Finite State Machines),
Brooks argues against even implicit representation here [65].
The “insect” robot Ghenghis [71] or the control architectures
used by Cruse [72] demonstrate how a reflex-like controller can
give rise to a walking pattern. There is no plan or model for the
behavior in the robots’ control architectures—walking arises
only through the interaction of the body with the environment
and simple sensor–actuator connections.
2) Model—Benefits and Costs: Before we ask ourselves the
question, what is the best body representation for a particular
robot, following up on the previous section, we propose to ask
another question first: what are the benefits and costs of having
a model of the robot’s body?
The benefit number one typically is that the model of a
robot (or plant) can be used for control. For instance, while
multi-DOF robotic manipulators can be precisely controlled
using the models and associated control techniques that were
developed [73], to our knowledge, it is not feasible to con-
trol such a plant without a representation of any sort. With
a precise representation of the robot’s body—its kinematics
and dynamics, including the actuation mechanism—it can be
used for precise feedforward control with little or no feedback.
In controlled environments, such as industrial settings, this is
sufficient. If feedback is present, the mappings from motors
to sensors can also be learned, giving rise to a forward model
(see Section II-E). Such a model can also be used to improve
closed-loop control: sensory feedback can be predicted in
advance—before it is actually received—and control action
can be adapted (see, e.g., [74]). This is especially useful when
the feedback comes with a significant delay. The fact that
the expected feedback can be predicted can be also used to
distinguish self-generated sensory information from sensory
input generated by the environment. An account of similar
scenarios in insects is provided by Webb [75]. A more elaborate
and decoupled forward model, i.e., a model that can be iterated
without actually executing the motor actions in the real world,
can be used for planning of whole action sequences. Based
on the predicted consequences, an appropriate action can be
selected (e.g., [62]). As the last benefit, if the model includes
a temporal dimension and uncertainty, using probabilistic
terminology, it can be used to perform not only prediction, but
also filtering (computing the belief state—posterior distribution
over the current state).
However, we should not forget that there are costs associated
with having models or representations. Such a model needs to
be developed and that has costs attached to it. Heikkonen and
Koikkalainen [76] report that robot programming—a substan-
tial part of which is the development of the robot’s model—ac-
counts for about one third of the cost of an industrial robot
system. The model is developed by engineers and given to the
robot. This may be acceptable if the job has to be done only
once—before the robot is put in operation. However, problems
arise if the conditions change over time; this can be due to de-
formations of body parts from wear and tear, but it can also be
due to more dramatic changes such as change of topology of the
robot or the robot using a tool. In such situations, a significant
part of the model would have to be reprogrammed giving rise to
additional costs—model maintenance costs. This motivates the
research in automatic model acquisition and adaptation.
B. What is Body Schema in a Robot?
It seems that in order for a robot to be able to perform a
goal-directed action, two components are essential. First, to per-
form the action itself, it is often necessary to know at least some
of the parameters of the system to be controlled. Second, if the
robot relies on its own sensory system and if the goal is ex-
pressed in one of the sensory modalities (such as an object to
be grasped in sight of a camera), a mapping between the sen-
sory and motor modalities has to exist [77]. These two compo-
nents can be almost completely separated or they can be com-
pletely intertwined. In robotics and control theory, the separa-
tion is typically clear. Even in the biological realm, there are
indications that sensorimotor representations operate on kine-
matic variables, while the details that are necessary to perform a
particular movement (an inverse dynamics model of the “plant”
which needs to include inertia, stiffness, possibly actuator dy-
namics, etc.) can be delegated to other control structures (such
as cerebellum and the spinal cord [78]) and to the body itself.
Let us first look at a prominent scenario, a multi-DOF robotic
manipulator. The typical goal is to make the end-effector reach
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a certain point in the workspace. While the goal is typically ex-
pressed in Cartesian or visual space, motor commands will be
issued in joint space. Thus, a coordinate transformation between
the two spaces is essential (confront with Section II-D and with
the notion of peripersonal space in Section II-C3). An example
of such a mapping is inverse kinematics, i.e., the manipulator
joint angles needed to achieve the desired position and orienta-
tion of the end-effector in Cartesian space can be obtained. In
industrial settings, a manipulator can often operate based solely
on the kinematic model, without visual feedback. The dynamics
(forces/torques needed to achieve desired positions) can be del-
egated to another subsystem (e.g., feedback controllers within
servo motors), or a separate dynamical model of the plant can
complement the kinematic model. We call the model used in this
case explicit. The kinematics (and dynamics) are described by
equations; the parameters, such as segment lengths and orienta-
tion of joints, are measured and inserted into the equations. The
platform and its model are then carefully calibrated. We can call
the model also objective; an attempt is made to objectively mea-
sure the physical reality of the robot and input it in the model.
Yet, we are dealing with a representation of the robot’s body that
can be used to guide actions, and thus, it can be classified as a
body schema. For us, however, it will lie on one end of the spec-
trum of research and we will discuss it only briefly. First, be-
cause we feel that such a model departs too far from the proper-
ties that we attribute to a body schema; contrary to its biological
counterpart, this model is typically fixed, explicit, precise, and
centralized. Perhaps even more importantly, it involves minimal
or no perception; it is given from the outside and thus relies on
information that biological agents cannot access. Second, mod-
eling and control of robotic manipulators (e.g., [73], [79], and
[80]), or robots in general (e.g., [81]), is already an enormous
research field in itself.
Articulated models come closer to the notion of body schema
as we know it from biology. Recall from Section II-E that an ar-
ticulated model is based on state variables (such as manipulator
joint angle positions) that interact according to the laws of dy-
namics and mechanics [61]. This time, however, the variables
have to be measured by the robot’s own sensors. Hersch et al.
[82] hence use the term subjective body schema. Usually, the
definition of state variables comes from the outside with prior
knowledge of the problem. The model can still have a form
of equations, as in [82]. However, we will regard even a body
schema that does not have a mathematical form as explicit, if
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the body parts of
the real robot and those in the model, as in [83]. Articulated
models will be discussed together with explicit models.
Explicit models have a number of advantages. The sensori-
motor mappings, as well as plant models are governed by ex-
plicit equations, and hence it is possible to calculate the behavior
of the system even in previously unseen situations. Also, as they
are more transparent, it may be easier to debug them and to as-
sess their performance. However, as the plant and sensorimotor
mappings become nonlinear (imagine a compliant pneumati-
cally driven robot with multiple modalities), a closed-form solu-
tion may not exist. Platforms that cannot be modeled explicitly
will be addressed by implicit models. Such a body representation
can be a simple look-up table with previously encountered sen-
sorimotor relationships, or, neural networks often serve as the
substrate for an implicit body schema. These models are typi-
cally more bio-inspired and will close the section on improving
robot behavior through a body schema. At the same time, they
will provide a natural transition to Section IV—that deals with
robots as tools to model biological body representations.
The representations of the robot’s body, as discussed
above, contain the long-term properties of the plant and hence
correspond to the notion of a long-term body schema (cf.
Sections II-A and II-E). However, what is no less important is
a short-term representation of the body—where it is in space
right now, for instance. Current sensory readings have to be
mapped onto some states (if there are states) in the long-term
body schema and can then be used to plan future actions, for
instance. The short-term body reprepresentations can have a
“winner-take-all” form, or they can have a probabilistic form,
where alternative states are possible, with given probabilities
(cf. gain fields and population based encoding in Section II-D).
The most prominent studies—using both explicit and im-
plicit representations—that we will review are summarized in
Table II.
C. Explicit Models
Fixed kinematic models will start off the section concerned
with explicit representations of robot bodies. Then we will move
to adaptive models—models that can self-calibrate or that can
even learn the topology of the body structure. These models are
inferred using the robot’s own sensors and hence are subjec-
tive, even though the perception is typically simplified. Finally,
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we will discuss models of the robot’s body that also include
dynamics.
1) Fixed Kinematic Models: Let us briefly look at a multi-
DOF robotic manipulator again. It operates based on its for-
ward and inverse kinematic functions that ensure the coordinate
transformation between the workspace (a Cartesian coordinate
system in which the goal for the end-effector is expressed), and
the joint space. The joint positions can be directly used as target
commands for servomotors.4 If the manipulator is accompanied
with a fixed camera that is observing the environment, an addi-
tional frame of reference transformation from the camera frame
reference to the Cartesian or task space has to be defined.
What are the limitations of this architecture? First, a fixed
kinematic model applies to robots obeying rigid body dynamics
only. Second, the model is designed from the outside and is not
adaptive. New calibrations have to be done in response to plant
drift (e.g., robot’s wear and tear). A change in the robot’s geom-
etry or the addition of a tool might require a new model. Third,
this approach is not easily extensible to include more modal-
ities (such as touch). Additional nonlinear sensorimotor map-
pings and their integration cannot be dealt with by the current
analytical machinery. Fourth, since dynamics was not addressed
by the kinematic model, this solution has variable performance
in different tasks, where the end-effector has to apply force, or
when external forces such as gravity loading change, or with
plants that cannot be directly position controlled (e.g., pneu-
matic actuators). All these shortcomings will be addressed in
the following sections.
2) Self-Calibration of a Parametrized Kinematic Model:
Self-calibration of a parametrized kinematic chain can deal
with changes in geometry over time (such as changes due to
material fatigue). Automatic calibration is only possible when
the system receives information from more than one source.
For instance, the calibration of a camera-manipulator system
can be achieved automatically by comparing the position of an
end-effector as observed by the camera with the one from the
forward kinematic function (after they have been converted to
a common, typically Cartesian, reference system). Leaving the
human engineer out of the loop can reduce costs. As a special
case of self-calibration, we include body schema extension in
this subsection. Automatic calibration of a model is addressed
by some traditional methods from machine learning [84],
system identification [85], [86], or probability theory [87].
More specifically, there is a number of solutions to the auto-
mated calibration of a kinematic chain [88]–[90] or a hand/eye
setup [91]. Typically, a sampling period in which different
configurations are visited is followed by an optimization proce-
dure.5 However, rather than “batch adaptation,” it is desirable to
develop systems that learn incrementally and online, following
the inspiration from biology.
Hersch et al. [82] present an extension of the self-calibration
approach. Taking advantage of prior knowledge of its kinematic
4This is often the case in robotics: proprioception from joints can at the same
time act as a motor command—it is the target position sent to a servomotor.
However, although this simplification may be convenient, we have to be aware
that it departs from biological reality.
5This is not the case for the exploration-estimation algorithm [92] though,
where the exploration strategy is more sophisticated and intertwined with the
model evaluation stage.
Fig. 4. Robot and its body schemata. (a) Hoap3 robot. (b) Body schema. Left:
“Real” schema. Middle: body schema learned by looking at hands and feet only.
Right: Body schema learned when looking at additional joints. Hersch et al.
[82].
structure (number, arrangement and type of DOFs), a simulated
24 DOF humanoid robot is able to learn the missing parameters
of the kinematic chain—position and orientations of joints—by
observing its body with a camera. A gradient descent algorithm
is then applied, the efficiency of which increases when addi-
tional joints, not only the end-effector, can be observed. On a
real robot (Hoap3, see Fig. 4), it was demonstrated that the al-
gorithm can cope with the incorporation of a stick as an exten-
sion to the body within two or three minutes (cf. Section II-C3).
In [93], this system is complemented by learning the neck-eyes
kinematic chain using optical flow, and the whole system is
demonstrated on the iCub humanoid robot. There are a couple
of features that bring this work closer to the biological notion of
body representations. First, contrary to the standard calibration
approaches in which a phase of sampling and optimization pre-
cedes the actual use, the algorithm of Hersch et al. [82] works
online. Second, it is a case of a “subjective body schema.” The
system is self-contained, or situated, in the sense that the sen-
sorimotor mappings learned are solely based on the informa-
tion acquired from the robot’s own sensory and motor signals.
The geometrical properties of the robot, such as the segment
lengths, of course mediate the sensorimotor relationships, but
cannot be accessed directly. The correspondence between the
different reference frames, e.g., from end-effector to head with
the camera, is given by the kinematic chain parameters which
are subject to learning. Thus, there is no precoded transforma-
tion given from the outside, such as one from a camera to Carte-
sian frame.
Martinez-Cantin et al. [94] presented an improvement in ef-
ficiency over the work of Hersch et al. First, they employed a
more efficient learning method than gradient descent for esti-
mating the body schema parameters: a recursive least squares
(RLS) estimator. Second, they explored the configuration space
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in an intelligent way, looking for the most informative measure-
ments based on the posterior uncertainty from the RLS.
Nabeshima et al. [95] also employ a traditional kinematic
controller. However, the problem they address is not self-cal-
ibration, but specifically body schema extension and the de-
tection of such a change. An upper humanoid torso is used
to reach for objects. Apart from proprioception (joint angles)
and vision, a third modality, touch, is involved. When the robot
hand touches a target, a learning process—spatio–temporal in-
tegration of the multimodal information that preceded the con-
tact—is triggered. This can be retrieved later from an associative
memory and used to drive a controller. When the robot arm is
extended with a stick (a primitive tool), contacts occur in new
situations, and a new kinematic controller is learned in response.
Neural networks are employed to implement the spatiotemporal
integration and learning. This work is much more bio-inspired
than what we have encountered and will encounter in this sec-
tion. However, as no explicit correspondence with biology is
established, we do not classify the work as biological modeling
(an example of which, Hikita et al. [96], will be presented in
Section IV).
3) Automatic Model Synthesis Including Topology: In this
section, we review robot kinematic models that can be synthe-
sized automatically with little prior knowledge. Contrary to the
previous section, no parametrized form of the model is nec-
essary. As a result of that, not only parameters like segment
lengths, but also the robot’s topology can be learned. Therefore
the work reviewed in this section does not only address body
schema extension, but can cope with more dramatic changes in
the robot’s body, such as the loss of a limb or a blocked joint,
leading to resilient machines. We will focus on two case studies:
1) the work by Sturm et al. [83], who show how a robotic ma-
nipulator can synthesize and adapt its kinematic model from
self-observation and can then use it for reaching; and 2) the work
by Bongard et al. [97], in which a quadrupedal robot continu-
ously models itself and generates new locomotion patterns.
Let us first point out what the two models have in common.
First, both models are explicit in the sense that there is a
one-to-one match between the components (e.g., body parts)
in the body schema (or model) and their counterparts in the
physical robot. The number of joints and body parts presents the
prior knowledge. Second, the controllers operate on kinematics
(dynamic disturbances are handled by position-controlled servo
motors), and only static configurations (i.e., not the dynamics
of behavior to reach that configuration) are used to assess the
match between the model and the physical robot. Third, both
present a case for a “subjective” schema, as the signals from the
robots’ own sensors are used to validate the model. And fourth
and last, there is a population of candidate models involved.
Let us start with the work of Sturm et al. [83]. Here, different
robotic manipulators are used (4, 6, and 7 DOF). The robot ob-
serves the pose of its body parts (with special visual markers)
using an external monocular camera (see Fig. 5). The goal is that
the model of the manipulator is learned through exploratory ac-
tions and self-observation. In Hersch et al. [82], described previ-
ously, the parameters of the kinematic chain were learned, pro-
viding a coordinate transformation between two sensory modal-
ities—visual (camera) and proprioceptive (joint space). On top
Fig. 5. A 6-DOF robotic manipulator arm learns and monitors its own body
schema using an external monocular camera and visual markers. Sturm et al.
[83].
of that, different, also classical, approaches to control can be
used, and will have to provide a mapping between motor com-
mands and joint angles. Thus, although their body represen-
tation could be used for action, it does not contain the motor
modality directly. Sturm et al., on the other hand, directly in-
clude the action commands. As we will see, their architecture
thus also provides a forward and inverse model of the robot (cf.
Section II-E).
The body schema in Sturm et al. is the joint probability
distribution of available actions signals (target angles sent
to individual joints), self-observations (as obtained from the
camera), and true poses of the body parts (hidden states).
The body schema is modeled as a Bayesian network, where
the nodes correspond to body parts, action signals and model
components. The structure of the network reflects the kinematic
chain. For example, the 6-D pose of a body part of the manip-
ulator depends on the pose of its predecessor and one of the
action signals. These dependencies enter the Bayesian network.
The learning problem is then factorized into two parts: First,
local models that describe the relationship between pairs of
body parts are learned using Gaussian processes regression.
Local models that do not explain data well are discarded.
Second, a graph is built from the valid local models. Under the
assumption that the manipulator has no cycles, the problem of
finding the kinematic structure of the manipulator corresponds
to the minimum spanning tree of this graph. The cost function
is defined as the combination of the marginal data likelihood
and a complexity penalty for each local model. Instead of using
joint encoders, the relationship between motor commands
and positions of the body parts of the manipulator is learned
directly, circumventing the mapping between the target motor
commands and the angle actually assumed by the joints. In
order to control the manipulator, an inverse model is needed,
i.e., a mapping from desired pose to action commands. While
this can be obtained by searching for the motor commands
that maximize the likelihood of generating the desired pose, it
results in a high-dimensional optimization problem. Therefore,
a different approach is used: the representation of the model
allows to apply differential kinematics, in particular, it is pos-
sible to compute the Jacobian of the forward model and thus a
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Fig. 6. Robot and its (incorrect) candidate model. Bongard et al. [97].
gradient-descent algorithm is used for selecting suitable motor
actions.
In their experiments, Sturm et al. demonstrate that: 1) the
robot can learn its kinematic model from scratch; and 2) the
robot can adapt the model to blocked joints as well as to de-
formations. This presents a solution to automatic model syn-
thesis, calibration, and body extension, as well as recovery from
damage. Furthermore, the model provides additional benefits
thanks to its probabilistic nature. First, information from the
robot model is combined with the sensory data in a statistically
optimal fashion, and the model also contains uncertainty of the
estimates. Second, each model candidate has an associated like-
lihood, and thus, multiple candidate models explaining data can
be kept in parallel. Classical control, which assumes a single
model, can thus be extended to take the uncertainty into account.
Third, extending the model in time would allow to perform
prediction, or filtering (computing the belief state). Therefore,
the Bayesian framework encompasses both long-term (structure
and parameters of the network) and short-term body schema
(current belief), and a forward and inverse model, including a
measure of the reliability of the information.
Bongard et al. [97] used a different platform, a quadrupedal
robot, whose body schema is to serve the synthesis of locomotor
behaviors. Compared to the manipulator arm scenario, the in-
teraction with the environment is much more profound here. A
model of the dynamics (mass and inertia) of the robot, as well
as of the ground and their interaction (friction model) is indis-
pensable. The robot’s self-model is split into two parts here. The
first part consists of an externally designed model of the robot
and the environment in a physics-based simulator. This is a spe-
cial form of an explicit model—equations of motion for the mo-
bile robot are not specified analytically, but they are embedded
in the physics-based simulator and numerically integrated. This
first part of the model contains the robot as a chain of rigid
bodies connected by servomotors, and remains fixed during ex-
periments (is “known” to the robot). The second part is the kine-
matic structure of the robot in the simulator, i.e., how are the
rigid bodies connected. This part is unknown to the robot and is
subject to learning and adaptation. Fig. 6 shows the real robot
and one candidate model (with incorrect kinematic structure)
in the simulator. To validate the model the information obtained
from the sensors on the real robot is compared with the one from
the simulated sensors in the simulator (cf. with the notion of em-
ulator and articulated model of Grush [61] and with mediated
model of Marques and Holland [62] in Section II-E).
A set of 15 candidate self-models is kept. In every (static) con-
figuration of the robot, the sensor readings are taken and com-
pared with the readings from the simulated robot in the same
configuration. In [97], only orientation sensors are used, but in
[98], more modalities are employed and their relevance is also
assessed. However, these configurations—or action that lead to
them—are not selected at random. It is the action that is ex-
pected to best disambiguate between the candidate models that
is executed on the real robot. Behavior synthesis on the model
pool thus precedes and only when the information expected to
gain is maximum, actions are executed on the real robot. On
damage (lower leg part breaks off), a mismatch between the
predicted and real sensory signals is detected, and exploration,
modeling, and testing is reinitiated until a new model which re-
flects the change is found.
This architecture also encompasses a forward model. Whole
action sequences can be executed in the simulator, and their out-
comes observed. New behaviors can thus be synthesized in the
model first, which would otherwise be a lengthy process on the
real robot. This is an advantage of an explicit model. Unlike
an implicit model, which allows to interpolate between actua-
tion-sensation patterns that have been seen before, an explicit
model allows to extrapolate, and to generate qualitatively new
behavioral patterns. Nevertheless, the (explicit) interaction with
the environment is very hard to model in this case (e.g., contact
modeling with the ground is a notorious problem) and there is
always going to be some discrepancy between the model and re-
ality (the reality gap). Although the parameters describing this
interaction (such as friction) were fixed in the physics-based
simulator and represented prior knowledge in the cited work,
in principle, they could also be adaptive.
4) Models Including Dynamics: Apart from the physics-
based simulation used by Bongard et al. [97], so far we have
dealt with kinematic models only—the forces and torques
required to cause a particular motion were not addressed.
Nonetheless, these are essential to finally execute an action.
This gap is filled by (inverse) dynamics models of the robot or
plant. This can be viewed as a relatively independent module
and there are indications that a similar strategy is used in
biological motor control [59]. Therefore, the models of robot
dynamics do not lie at the center of our interest and we refer
the reader to many textbooks on the topic, e.g., [73], [79],
and [80].
Having drawn this parallel between inverse dynamics in bio-
logical and robotic motor control, let us also point out the impor-
tant differences between them. It is probably fair to say that the
basis of the field of control in robotics is largely formed by engi-
neered models (e.g., computed-torque control [73], [79]). While
model adaptation and dealing with uncertainty is also addressed
(by robust and adaptive control [79]), adaptation to dramatic
changes in the robot dynamics lies still outside of the scope of
these methods. Similarly, the platforms that can be modeled are
still largely restricted (mostly stiff rigid bodies). On the other
hand, we know that biological motor control can deal with both
significant changes to the dynamics or to the kinematics, and
with compliant platforms, for instance. Therefore, if we want to
deal with such robotic platforms, we may need to resort to im-
plicit models, and this takes us to the next section.
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D. Implicit Models
This section reviews work where an implicit representation
of the robot’s body is used. This can take a form of a simple
look-up table or it can be a neural network, for instance. We will
also review work that deals with self-recognition—how does
the robot find its body and separate it from the environment.
Finally, we will look at models that address the issue of delays in
the effects of robot’s actions. Compared to the explicit models,
much less prior knowledge enters the implicit representations.
1) Representations of Sensorimotor Mappings: To derive an-
alytical equations representing the kinematics and dynamics of
a controlled system is not always possible. In situations where
this is not feasible (in highly nonlinear systems with compliant
actuation composed of deformable bodies, for instance), these
mappings can still be learned using different function approxi-
mation techniques. Such mappings can either aid standard con-
trol schemes (as in the case of neural networks for control), or
they can be control schemes in their own respect.
If a model of a plant cannot be obtained analytically, it is
still valuable to obtain a model that treats the target system as a
black-box. Its input–output behavior can be learned by a system
identification process. By observing the responses of a system
to different inputs a forward model can be learned. For control,
however, an inverse model is typically required. This can be ei-
ther obtained by inverting the forward model (which is possible
only in special cases), by directly learning the inverse mapping,
or by the so-called distal supervised learning approach [106].
Inverse kinematics can be approximated by various approaches:
locally weighted regression [107], multilayer perceptrons, or ra-
dial basis functions [108], [109]. Over the past decades, con-
nectionist approaches have been integrated into numerous con-
trol architectures (for instance model reference adaptive control,
model predictive control, internal model control [110]), where
they form one or more of the building blocks: plant model, in-
verse plant model, or controller. One of the earliest architec-
tures that is still being developed is the cerebellar model articu-
lation controller (CMAC) [111], [112]. We will refer the reader
to the abundant literature on the topic of neural networks in tra-
ditional control schemes [108], [113], [114]. Interestingly, un-
supervised (or self-supervised) neural network architectures can
also be used. Barreto et al. [115] demonstrate the use of self-or-
ganizing maps and some of their advantages. For instance, the
topological arrangement of network nodes ensures that a redun-
dant manipulator is well-behaved. A “lazy” cost function is im-
plicitly coded—while looking for an adjacent target point, an
adjacent joint configuration is automatically selected.
The big advantage of implicit approaches is that almost
arbitrary sensorimotor mappings can be represented. For in-
stance, inverse dynamics does not present a problem with
different characteristics, assumptions, and complexity than
inverse kinematics, as is the case with explicit modeling. If
dynamic instead of kinematic variables are fed to the learning
algorithm, inverse dynamics can be learned in a similar manner
(e.g., [116]). Similarly, platforms that were outside of the scope
of analytical modeling, such as pneumatically driven robots,
can now be treated equally easily [117]. The problems of
coordinate transformations and forward modeling do not have
to be addressed as separate building blocks anymore.
To further illustrate the case of sensorimotor mappings, let
us look at visually guided reaching. This is a hand–eye coordi-
nation problem and there are two basic strategies to tackle it: 1)
open-loop control, in which a sensorimotor map that relates the
hand visual location and the arm position from proprioception
is needed; and 2) closed-loop control, where the visual Jacobian
of the manipulator is needed. The open-loop strategy can be
realized through a combination of classical explicit frame of
reference transformations that involve the hand, body, and
camera reference frames. As mentioned in Section III-C2,
these maps can be obtained through automated calibration
procedures (kinematic chain [88]–[90], hand/eye setup [91]).
However, a highly structured environment is typically required
for these calibration procedures (see [118] for more details).
The Jacobian that is needed for the closed-loop strategy (or
visual servoing [119]) can be derived analytically, or estimated
[120].6 The two strategies, open-loop and closed-loop can
also be combined, as demonstrated by Natale et al. [118],
for instance, where reaching in 3-D is possible without prior
knowledge of the kinematic model.
The mappings needed to perform visually guided reaching
can also be coded implicitly. For instance camera calibra-
tion and triangulation can be learned in an implicit manner
[121], [122]. Moreover, interestingly, the open-loop component
which requires a sensorimotor mapping can be turned into a
motor–motor coordination problem, as demonstrated by [99],
[100], [123]. Rather than learning the mapping between visual
space and arm motor space directly, the eye–head system is
exploited. A camera is let to fixate on the target (this can be
precoded or learned separately) and the appropriate motor vari-
ables of the eye–head plant are extracted and used to learn the
relationship with the hand motor plant variables that represent
reaching to the target. This relationship can be represented by
a look-up table [99] or by a self-organizing map [100]. The
learned mapping reduces the dimensionality of the problem,
and is an instance of a body schema which allows to reach
to a certain point in space—the target to which the eyes are
looking—in an open-loop fashion. Metta et al. [99] also spell
out the important features that characterize their approach:
1) the kinematic and dynamic parameters are not explicitly
identified as in classical control theory approaches; and 2) there
is no distinction between the system’s calibration and control.
In other words, the two processes are completely intertwined,
and the performance of the overall system can grow in an
incremental fashion over time.
2) Self-Recognition: In the works that we have described so
far, the goal was to acquire or adapt a body representation. The
representation itself has taken various forms—an explicit kine-
matic chain, a model in a physics-based simulator, or a cluster
of implicit sensorimotor mappings. However, it was assumed
that a robot knows which signals come from its body. For in-
stance, in the work of Hersch et al. [82] or Sturm et al. [83] (see
Sections III-C2 and III-C3), all the body parts of interest were
visible and easy to distinguish. In reality—if we take a devel-
opmental perspective and assume that the robot does not have
6The Jacobian is a good example that sensorimotor maps can represent rela-
tionships between higher order (in this case first-order since Jacobian is a deriva-
tive) variables as well.
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this prior knowledge—the robot first needs to ‘find itself’ in the
stream of sensorimotor signals (cf. Section II-C1).
Yoshikawa et al. [101] address the problem of how a robot
identifies its arms in a visual image. Unlike objects in the en-
vironment, the arms remain at fixed positions, and due to this
invariance, they can be extracted from the visual scene and iden-
tified as belonging to the body. Hebbian learning is employed
to pick up this invariance between the visual modality (disparity
after the eyes fixate on an object), and proprioception (position
of cameras—pan, tilt). The work of Yoshikawa et al. [124] is an
extension of this strategy to multiple visual attributes (disparity,
luminance, chroma, and edges). Since the arms are not allowed
to move, the procedure is dominated by perception and we can
talk about acquisition of body image (cf. Section II-C1).
A largely converse strategy is employed by Fitzpatrick and
Metta [125], Natale et al. [103], and Gold and Scassellati [102].
It is the active behavior of the robot that is used to self-recog-
nize. Kemp and Edsinger [126] can perhaps be viewed as a tran-
sition between the two strategies. The robot’s arms are allowed
to move, but it is spatial contingency—mutual information be-
tween salient patches in the visual scene and expectations on
appearance and position of the robot’s parts—that allows self-
recognition. On the other hand, it is temporal contingency that is
utilized in [102], [103], [125]. The robot learns to recognize its
body parts because they are moving. However, since external
objects can be moving as well, it is the correlation between
the visual input (optic flow) and the motor signal that facili-
tates the body identification [125]. Natale et al. [103] improve
the robustness of this procedure by using periodic hand mo-
tions. Then, the robot’s hand could be segmented by selecting,
among the pixels that moved periodically, only those whose pe-
riod matched that of the wrist joints. Gold and Scassellati [102]
use probabilistic reasoning and examine the likelihood of three
alternative models: 1) robot’s own motors generated the move-
ment; 2) something else generated the movement; or 3) irregular
movement. Case (1) would correspond to the robot’s own body.
Unlike the case of Yoshikawa et al., action plays a key part in
these methods. Therefore, it is more appropriate to talk about
body schema acquisition and sense of agency (cf. Section II-C1
again). We also want to point out that this strategy can be natu-
rally extended to action recognition in others and imitation (see
[102]), tool use, or interaction with objects (see [103]).
3) Temporal Models: We have seen how an agent can ex-
ploit temporal contingencies to self-recognize. However, once
the agent has found its body, should the temporal domain be still
preserved in the synthesis of body representations? The sensori-
motor mappings that were discussed so far were largely relation-
ships between various modalities in static configurations. Some
architectures encompassed a forward or inverse model and thus,
allowed to iterate a body state in time. However, in reality, dif-
ferent actuators as well as sensors have their specific time delays
associated with them. A body schema unfolded in time can be
nicely represented with a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN).
Dearden and Demiris [104] used a similar approach to Sturm
et al. [83], but included motor delays into the body schema. The
problem of model selection among competing candidate body
schemata (as represented by the DBN) has thus grown to include
the temporal dimension. Hidden states are discrete and represent
the states of two grippers (open/closed). Observables are based
on optic flow in the visual scene; visual blobs are extracted and
clustered with a -means algorithm. The prior knowledge that
enters the body schema is the “template” for the structure of the
Bayesian network: from motors to hidden states to observables.
While this approach is more general than Sturm’s [83], the toll
that needs to be paid is that the system has much fewer DOF
(essentially 2).
The work by Grimes et al. [105] uses a similar approach, but
addresses a different problem: bipedal locomotion. Humanoid
walking is a much more difficult problem than robotic manip-
ulation. Balance becomes a key issue, modeling dynamics be-
comes inescapable, and we have to deal with a floating-base
system. Traditionally, explicit modeling is performed based on
CAD data, followed by further parameter estimation. The most
famous control scheme in use is the zero-moment point (ZMP)
control [127]. While this is commonly applied in walking hu-
manoids ([128]–[130]), it has not yet been possible to extend it
to rough terrain ([131] is an attempt in this direction, but on a
quadruped platform). Therefore, Grimes et al. [105], instead of
using an explicit physics-based model of the robot and a con-
trol scheme on top of this, adopted a model-free, or implicit,
approach. The kinematic and dynamic states are represented in
a DBN, together with action commands and observables. The
problem of balance is addressed by a relationship between sen-
sors (gyroscope and pressure sensors), which is, again, an in-
stance of a subjective or situated body schema. Parameters for
the model are learned with Gaussian processes. Implementa-
tions with Bayesian networks have the usual benefits that they
allow for prediction, planning, or filtering, all that with measures
of uncertainty. Moreover, both Dearden and Demiris [104] and
Grimes et al. have shown how to utilize their architectures in an
imitation scenario.
IV. ROBOTS AS MODELS OF BIOLOGICAL
BODY REPRESENTATIONS
As we have seen in Section II, although direct recordings
from the brain have revealed relevant facts about body repre-
sentations in biology, the mechanisms underlying the working
and the development of body schema (and body image) in an-
imals and humans are still far from clear. A difficulty in un-
derstanding such mechanisms from the observation of neural
activity alone is that it is hard to separate the influence of the
target mechanism on the recorded data from a variety of other
processes inside the brain, as they result from the interaction
among brain, body, and environment. A synthetic approach—in-
vestigating the phenomena of interest by implementing them in
robots (e.g., [132])—is a promising methodology to overcome
the difficulties that computational neuroscience faces. Not only
the mechanisms underlying a mature body schema, but also its
development in infants can be addressed by synthetic modeling
(Asada et al. [133] provide an excellent review). Body schema
implementations that aim at modeling biology naturally feature
more biologically realistic architectures and mechanisms. Heb-
bian learning, self-organizing map (SOM), or spike timing-de-
pendent plasticity (STDP) are often employed. In some cases, it
is possible to establish a correspondence between the proposed
models and neural firing patterns in the cortex [96], [134]. While
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TABLE III
MODELS OF BODY REPRESENTATIONS IN BIOLOGY—AN OVERVIEW
it is probably fair to say that this body of research is at its nascent
stage, there are a couple of relevant cases that will be described
below. The scenarios we will come across will resemble the
ones from Section III, but this time, the architectures will not
merely draw inspiration from biological body representations,
but will explicitly attempt to model the biological mechanisms.
We will structure this section as follows. Many synthetic
studies have been carried out to understand multimodal
body representations which, in primates, are found in the
parietal cortex. Here, we categorize them into two groups:
nonaction-oriented body representations (body image), and
action-oriented ones (body schema). The former body of work
employs cross-modal maps that are modified through Hebbian
learning applied on individual modalities [96], [134]–[137].
The latter category comprises studies in which the acquired
body representations are utilized to coordinate the robot’s
behavior [138]–[140]. Third, we will review the work by Ku-
niyoshi and Sangawa [141] where the emphasis is placed on the
physical interaction between body and environment and on the
effect of low-level (spinal) control. On top of these, low-level
sensorimotor representations can emerge. The most prominent
studies that we will review are summarized in Table III.
A. Nonaction-Oriented Body Representations (Body Image)
Many synthetic studies have focused on how to integrate in-
formation from tactile, visual, and proprioceptive sensor spaces.
The “body maps” that are acquired are used for recognition of
the agent’s own body (cf. Section III-D2). Yoshikawa et al.
[136] focused on correlations in the activation of tactile, vi-
sual, and proprioceptive modalities. Through an experience of
self-touching, maps linking the modalities were associated by
Hebbian learning. While Yoshikawa’s study allows to repre-
sent only body parts that are visible to the robot, Fuke et al.
[135] proposed a model in which the invisible parts—the robot’s
face—can also be incorporated into the body representation.
This was done via learning a Jacobian from the motor (joint)
space to the visual space. Integrating the velocity, position in
visual space can be estimated for invisible parts as well. Then,
while the robot was touching its face with the arm, the posi-
tion in the visual modality could be estimated and matched with
the touch modality—learning a cross-modal map. It is then hy-
pothesized that a fetus establishes this correspondence while
touching its face in the womb and this may explain why a new-
born is able to respond to faces immediately after birth.
Another important topic is body schema adaptation during
tool use (see Section II-C3). While we have encountered imple-
mentations of this behavior in the section on applications (e.g.,
[82], [83], and [95]), the mechanisms employed were only in-
spired by biology. The approach of Hikita et al. [96], on the
other hand, models the mechanisms hypothesized to be used
in humans. In particular, they focus on the role of the atten-
tion system in detecting body extension by a tool. Based on a
neurobiological model by Itti et al. [142], a model that enables
a robot to detect its own end-effector by associating proprio-
ceptive information with visual information during visual at-
tention, a saliency map, is proposed. Tactile sensation on the
robot’s hand is used to trigger the association.7 The representa-
tion enables a real robot to recognize its own body and there is
an analog to the findings in parietal cortex during use of a tool,
as described in [27] (see Figs. 7 and 8).
Fuke et al. [134] extended the problem of integrating tactile,
visual, and proprioceptive modalities by addressing the frame
of reference transformation that needs to occur between an
eye-centered and a head-centered reference frame. A model
was proposed according to the relation between VIP and LIP in
human and primate brains as described in Section II-D. Based
on studies on infants [15], this integration is assumed to be
achieved through hand regard behavior: human infants gaze at
their own hands in front of their face at around four months
of age. In the experiments of Fuke et al. a robot first acquires
a head-centered visual space representation by associating
ocular angles and camera images while gazing at its hand
moving. Then, it integrates tactile sensations with visual stimuli
by touching its face. Experimental results with a simulated
human-like robot show that the activities of the acquired maps
are similar to the ones of the VIP neurons as observed in [47].
The correspondence of the model with brain regions is shown
in Fig. 9.
B. Action-Oriented Body Representations (Body Schema)
This section deals with models of biological body representa-
tions used to guide actions. In some studies, cross-modal maps
are first acquired and then exploited to plan the behavior of
robots. Morasso and Sanguineti [138] have proposed a model
of body schema for motor planning that is presumably carried
7This work resembles the experiments by Nabeshima et al. [95] that we have
encountered in Section III-C2. However, unlike Nabeshima, Hikita’s work is a
more direct attempt at modeling the putative biological mechanisms.
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Fig. 7. Overview of the model proposed by Hikita et al. [96]. The association
between the posture of the robot’s arm and position in the visual field is triggered
by tactile stimulation. A saliency map makes a robot fixate a point of contact
between its end-effector and an object, since more salient features are observed
at that point.
Fig. 8. Body schema extension during tool use. The connection between vi-
sual and proprioceptive fields: (a) and (b) without a tool; (c) and (d) with a tool
(from Hikita et al. [96]). The red areas show a strong connection between visual
and proprioceptive spaces in each setting. Confront Fig. 1 for the results from
monkeys. (a) Without a tool; (b) connection weights of (a); (c) with a tool; (d)
connection weights of (c).
out in area 5 of the posterior parietal cortex in association with
the basal ganglia. The model is called SO-BoS (self-organizing
body-schema) and consists of two components: a sensorimotor
mapping (forward kinematic model implemented as a self-orga-
nizing cortical map), and inverse sensorimotor mapping (inverse
kinematic model implemented as a gradient-descent mechanism
in a potential field). The former is first acquired through motor
Fig. 9. Correspondence between brain regions (a) and representation spaces
(b) proposed by Fuke et al. [134]. Eye information space is combined with arm
posture space into a head-centered visual space. This process bears similarity
to connections among F4 and LIP areas. Integration of the head-centered visual
space and tactile space produce neural activities similar to the ones observed in
VIP area.
babbling. Then, the latter is tuned depending on the task con-
straints such as the target position and the posture to reach a
target. Results of a simulation of a 3-degree-of-freedom arm
show that the proposed model can realize different reaching be-
haviors that satisfy the constraints. However, the platform used
is rather simplistic and the work has a more computational than
synthetic modeling flavor.
Stoytchev [143] extended this model to a tool use scenario.
An offset vector was added that represented the distance in the
visual field from a position of an end-effector to the tip of a
tool attached to the end-effector. Results with a simulation of a
2-degree-of-freedom arm showed that the proposed model can
extend the body representation and successfully approach a vi-
sual target using the tool. The author has also shown that this
model can acquire an extended body representation that allows
the robot to guide its arm movements through a TV image. The
robot detects its own body part based on the synchronization be-
tween its own movements and the changes of visual features on
the TV screen [139].
Pitti et al. [140] have encoded body representations as a
spatio–temporal pattern of neural activities in sensorimotor
networks. Coordinated behavior, induced by morphological
properties, was produced. Spiking neural networks were used
to acquire mappings from a log-polar representation combined
with a saliency map to motor commands for controlling the
neck and the camera’s orientation. Connections were regulated
by spike-timing-dependent plasticity. Interaction among the
body, environment, and the nervous system enabled a robot to
self-organize the fixation behavior and the saccade behavior to
a salient object. Analysis of the neural activities in the networks
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Fig. 10. Low-level body representations in a fetal model (Kuniyoshi and San-
gawa [141]) (a) a fetus body model. Its physical properties such as size, mass and
joint angle limitations were based on biological findings. (b) Cortico-medular-
spinal-muscular model. (c) Self-organizing map from M1 to , which displayed
separation into areas corresponding to different body parts through spontaneous
movement driven by the activities of the CPGs.
revealed a distinction between movement caused by the agent
itself and that caused externally, thus representing a sense of
agency (cf. Sections II-C1 and III-D2).
C. Development of a Low-Level Body Schema
Kuniyoshi and Sangawa [141] investigated the role of tight
coupling between a body and its environment and how consis-
tent dynamical patterns can emerge from this close physical in-
teraction. They proposed a model of a neuro-musculo-skeletal
system that consists of biologically realistic components such
as a skeleton, muscles, spindles, tendon organs, spinal circuits,
medullar circuits, and central pattern generators (CPGs). On
top of that, a basic cortical model from self-organizing maps
was constructed. The connections were modulated by Hebbian
learning rule during spontaneous movement driven by the activ-
ities of the lower circuits. Self-organized body movement was
observed in a simple musculo-skeletal model which consisted
of two rigid objects connected with a free joint and multiple
muscle fibers. This mediated the acquisition of low-level body
representations, such as the relations between agonist and antag-
onist muscles. Further experiments with a human fetal model
showed that simple movements, such as crawling and rolling,
can emerge. The cortical maps displayed a separation into areas
corresponding to different body parts shown in Fig. 10. Related
to this work, a real robot that has anthropomimetic features is
currently developed in the context of the ECCEROBOT project,
where the development of a body schema will be subject to in-
vestigation [144].
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The research in cognitive sciences deals with many body rep-
resentations that are short-term or long-term, conscious or un-
conscious, perception- or action-oriented. Synthesizing the pu-
tative mechanisms behind the biological body representations in
robots can serve two goals. First, it can help to endow the robots
with new capabilities that are ubiquitous in nature, yet unattain-
able by the machines of today. Second, synthetic modeling, i.e.,
investigating hypothetical mechanisms in artificial brain-body-
environment systems, can complement empirical studies of psy-
chology and neurosciences. These two avenues have been the
subject of the present review.
To this end, we have first presented a review of the treat-
ment of body representations in cognitive sciences. However,
our survey was biased by having a robotic implementation in
mind. Body representations in robots cover only a subspace of
their biological counterparts so far. They can be long-term or
short-term, but they can hardly be considered conscious and they
are largely action-oriented (since we are usually interested in
the robots performing some task). Therefore, we have largely
neglected the phenomenological, or reflective, mechanisms of
body representations, but concentrated on more low-level, pre-
reflective, computational mechanisms such as plasticity of body
representations, or coordinate transformations. We have explic-
itly attempted to clarify the relationship between the closely re-
lated notions of body schema, body image, peripersonal space
and forward models.
To have a model of a robot in order to control it comes naturally
to most control engineers and roboticists. A model of a plant (or
robot) indeed is a representation that is used to guide the robot’s
actions and can thus be considered a kind of body schema. How-
ever, such a model has very different characteristics from those of
a biological body schema: typically it is fixed, explicit, precise,
centralized, and objective. These very characteristics of a clas-
sical model of a plant restrict the domains in which robots can
be successfully used to very limited, precisely controlled envi-
ronments. There are also costs associated with the development
of such a model. Therefore, it is desirable that robots can de-
velop, calibrate and adapt their models automatically. We have
reviewed work that departs from the traditional field of robotics
and extends it toward online automatic self-calibration. Beyond
self-calibration, architectures that can also cope with topological
changes have been analyzed, paving the way for the adaptive and
the resilient machines of the future. Apart from body representa-
tions that have an explicit nature, the body schema of a robot can
also be represented in an implicit manner. While this traditionally
meant a connectionist (neural network) implementation, models
using Bayesian networks are gaining popularity.
Both, explicit and implicit representations, have their pros
and cons. Explicit models typically require more input from the
designer—a parametrized kinematic model, or at least number
and characteristics of joints, for instance. On the other hand,
what they offer in return, can be possible integration with tradi-
tional control schemes, extrapolation to previously unseen con-
figurations, or easier debugging. A representation that has an an-
alytical form is also more compact and has an infinite resolution
compared to a look-up table or self-organizing map that stores
previously seen sensorimotor relationships only. The biggest
merits of implicit representations probably are that little prior
knowledge is required, and even problems that are outside of
the scope of analytical treatment (e.g., deformable bodies) can
be tackled. Calibration of sensorimotor mappings and their em-
ployment in control can be intertwined.
The mechanisms underlying the working and development of
body schema (and body image) in animals and humans are still
far from clear. Uncovering them has been largely the task of
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neuroscience. Many findings were obtained by direct record-
ings from brain. However, even though the recording/imaging
techniques are improving, there are still a lot of difficulties as-
sociated with “live” recordings from experimental subjects. Em-
pirical studies have been supplemented by computational mod-
eling. However, in many situations, a whole brain-body-envi-
ronment system is indispensable. This is where robots and sim-
ulated robots come into play as tools to investigate biological
body schema. While it is probably fair to say that many of the
results are still preliminary, there are several relevant cases that
we have reviewed.
We want to conclude by identifying the trends and also the
weak spots in the research that we have just summarized and
also propose areas for future research. First, the work on models
in robotics is heavily biased toward manipulator arms, observed
by a camera (cf. “humanoid torso” in Tables II and III). At the
same time, the platforms are typically very stiff. This holds not
only for traditional, but also for bio-inspired research. There-
fore, a future research challenge is to deal with other behaviors
and platforms: locomotion and compliant robots, for instance.
Second, the integration of multiple modalities as demonstrated
by biological agents, is still largely lacking—visual modality is
often the only one that complements proprioception (joint an-
gles). Third, next to traditional analytical methods from con-
trol theory and connectionist models, Bayesian networks are be-
coming a prominent tool to represent a body schema, with the
additional benefits of integrating uncertainty in them. Fourth,
most of the research discussed is demonstrated to work in rather
simple scenarios (limited number of degrees of freedom, for
instance). The extent to which the individual solutions can be
scaled up is an open question.
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